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INTERMEDIARY RISK IN THE INDIRECT
HOLDING SYSTEM FOR SECURITIES*
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I.  THE PROBLEM
In a wide range of international commercial and financial trans-
actions,  intermediaries hold assets in which they, as well as investors,
share rights that entitle them to some direct beneficial or equitable
interest in these assets.1  The sharing of rights raises concerns that if
an intermediary fails, creditors of the failed intermediary can claim
against assets held by the intermediary for the benefit of investors;
this is referred to as “intermediary risk.”2
Intermediary risk is important not only because it affects indi-
vidual investors but also because it can be systemic.  The failure of an
intermediary can cause a chain reaction of failures of institutions that
have invested in assets held by the intermediary.  Indeed, because of
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1. This can occur, for example, in the trading of investment securities, the sale of loan par-
ticipations, and in securitization transactions.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a
Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541 (2001) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk].  This can
also occur in collateral management products offered by global custodians, including in par-
ticular prime brokerage.  See generally JOANNA BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES: A
PROPRIETARY LAW ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS ch. 10 (2000)
[hereinafter BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES]; JOANNA BENJAMIN, LEGAL RISK
MANAGEMENT IN GLOBAL SECURITIES INVESTMENT AND COLLATERAL ch. 5 (forthcoming
2002).
2. This intermediary risk is different than the risk that arises in traditional agency situa-
tions, in which intermediaries (called trustees or agents) hold assets in a custodial capacity on
behalf of multiple investors.  In those situations, the intermediary has no beneficial rights in the
assets.
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the international tiering of intermediaries, such a chain reaction, if it
involved an intermediary holding a large enough quantity of assets,
could threaten the very stability of the global financial system.3  In-
termediary risk is most prevalent in the indirect holding system for
securities.  In that context, it affects investors and their secured credi-
tors.
II.  INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM FOR SECURITIES
Under the traditional system for direct holding of securities, in-
dividual securities were issued to investors who in turn had the right
to trade those securities to other investors.  An indirect holding sys-
tem has since evolved, in which intermediary entities—“securities in-
termediaries”4—not only hold the securities on behalf of investors but
also frequently own beneficial rights in those securities.5
In an indirect holding system, an issuer of securities generally re-
cords ownership of its securities as belonging to one or more deposi-
tory intermediaries.6  Although physical certificates exist for most se-
curities held through a depository intermediary, these certificates
remain in that intermediary’s possession and are never delivered to
3. Cf. Charles Mooney, Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of
Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 413 (1990) (noting
the primary importance of the issue of intermediary risk); James Steven Rogers, Policy Per-
spectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1450 (1996) (arguing that the first
element of the “core of the package of rights and duties that define the relationship between a
securities intermediary and a person . . . who holds a securities position through that intermedi-
ary” is that such person “does not take the credit risk of the intermediary’s other business activi-
ties; that is, property held by the intermediary is not subject to the claims of the intermediary’s
general creditors.”).
4. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a) (2001) (using the same definition).
5. Thus, “[s]ecurities today are generally held indirectly through multiple tiers of inter-
mediaries.  Cross-border investment requires not only tiering of intermediaries, but also in-
volvement by intermediaries in different countries, with each tier being subject to a different
country’s laws.  Existing national laws contain unnecessary ambiguities when applied to such
multi-tiered securities holding systems.”  Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, Brussels
Office, as Operator of the Euroclear Sys., Cross-Border Clearance, Settlement and Custody:
Beyond the G30 Recommendations xiii (June 1993) (referring to legal ambiguities regarding
intermediary risk); see also Richard Potok, Legal Uncertainty for Securities Held as Collateral, 18
INT’L FIN. L. REV. 12, 12 (1999) (stating that,”[I]t is no wonder that financial institutions are
paying more attention to the legal risk associated with taking securities held through multiple
tiers of intermediaries [since] in the last decade there has been a sharp increase in the number of
arrangements within the financial services industry . . . involving a cross-border element.”).
6. See U.C.C. § 8, I.D. (2001) (prefatory note).  Under an English law analysis, this occurs
in the case of registered securities, where the issuer maintains a register of legal ownership.  In
the case of bearer securities, legal ownership is determined by possession of the physical instru-
ment constituting the securities.
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third parties.7  The depository intermediary records the identities of
other intermediaries, such as brokerage firms or banks, that purchase
interests in these securities.8  Those other intermediaries in turn rec-
ord the identities of investors that purchase interests in the interme-
diaries’ interests.9
For example, consider an investor wishing to invest in 500 shares
of ABC Corporation’s stock.  In theory, that investor could purchase
500 individual shares of ABC stock from a brokerage firm.  For rea-
sons discussed below, the broker, however, may not directly hold in-
dividual shares.  Companies often issue securities in very large blocks.
For purposes of this example, assume that ABC issued a certificate
for 1,000,000 shares of its stock to a depository.  If a broker then
wishes to purchase 50,000 shares of ABC stock, some perhaps for its
own account and some for customers, it would pay the depository the
market price for those shares.10  In return, the broker would effec-
tively receive a 5% undivided, or pro rata, interest in the 1,000,000
share certificate.11  If the investor then seeks to purchase 500 shares of
ABC stock from that broker, the investor would pay the broker the
market price for those shares and, in return, effectively would receive
a 1% undivided interest in the broker’s 5% undivided interest.12 
7. See id.  Under an English law analysis, paper issued in respect of the underlying securi-
ties by their issuer are categorized by type: Registered securities are categorized as certificates,
which are evidence of the securities; bearer securities are categorized as instruments which con-
stitute the securities.  See generally BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
In either case, the paper remains with the depository.
8. BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
9. Id.  “Such intermediation suggests the image of a series of Russian dolls, one inside the
other, with the smallest doll containing a jewel.  Each doll is different from every other doll, al-
though the value of all the dolls derives alike from the jewel.  The jewel equates by analogy to
the underlying securities, and each doll to a different interest in securities.”  Id. at 30.
10. The depository then would turn over that payment to ABC.  Although the actual pay-
ment mechanics sometimes might work differently (e.g., in underwriting security offerings), the
differences would not be relevant to this article’s analysis of intermediary risk.
11. 1,000,000 shares (held by depository) x 5% (broker’s interest) = 50,000 share equiva-
lent.
12. 1,000,000 shares (held by depository) x 5% (broker’s interest) x 1% (investor’s interest)
= 500 share equivalent.  There are two clarifications to the foregoing example.  In practice, the
broker is most likely to buy equivalent shares in order to accommodate a simultaneous sale to
the investor.  Also, at least under U.C.C. Article 8, the actual records would reflect the flat
number of shares (in the foregoing example, 500) to avoid any confusion if the broker’s undi-
vided interest in the certificate later increases.  These technicalities, however, are irrelevant to
this article’s arguments.
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The indirect holding system is “widely used in global trading” of
securities,13 and is decisively replacing direct holding because it both
reduces the overall costs and complexities of record-keeping and low-
ers the risk of loss occasioned by physically transferring securities.14
In addition to facilitating settlement (i.e., delivery), the use of inter-
mediaries assists cross-border investment,15 as well as the repackaging
of securities in securitization, depositary receipt, investment fund, and
other structures.16
Sometimes the securities intermediaries are transnational organi-
zations.  For example, securities settled through Euroclear, the
world’s largest securities intermediary for internationally-traded secu-
rities,17 are held by local depositories that are members of the Euro-
clear depository network.18  Other times, the securities intermediaries
are national entities that have created linkages through which a non-
resident of the security’s country of issue could effect settlement of a
cross-border trade: (1) through direct access to (membership in) the
[securities intermediary] in the country of issue, e.g. the Depository
Trust Company (DTC) in the United States; (2) through a local agent
who is a member of the securities intermediary in the country of is-
sue; (3) through a global custodian who employs a local agent as sub-
custodian; (4) through a [securities intermediary] in the non-
resident’s own country who has established a link [to the securities in-
termediary] in the country of issue; or (5) through an international se-
curities intermediary, such as Euroclear or CEDEL, that has estab-
13. Roy Goode, The Nature and Transfer of Rights in Dematerialized and Immobilized Se-
curities, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET, LEGAL AND REGULATORY
ASPECTS 107, 110 (Fidelis Oditah ed., 1996).
14. Investors, for example, “obtain expert safekeeping services rather than running the risk
of keeping physical possession of their own certificates, assure themselves of the ability to trans-
fer securities rapidly in settlement of trades, and obtain professional services in the complex re-
cord keeping involved in tracking their investments, distributions, calls, and the like.”  James
Steven Rogers, Revised U.C.C. Article 8: Why It Is Needed, What It Does, U.C.C. Bulletin 3
(Dec. 1994) [hereinafter Rogers, Revised U.C.C. Article 8]; accord U.C.C. § 8, I.A. (2001)
(prefatory note).
15. See BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES, supra note 1, at 201.
16. Id. at 29; see generally id. at chs. 11, 12.
17. Euroclear is operated by the Brussels office of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of
New York and owned by Euroclear Participants, firms engaged professionally in the securities
markets and which meet admission criteria based, among other things, on financial soundness
and reputation in the market.  See generally http://www.euroclear.com (last visited Apr. 14,
2002).
18. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 845 (6th ed. 1999).
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lished a direct or indirect link to the securities intermediary in the
country of issue.19
For ease of discussion, this article will simplify certain terminol-
ogy when referring to a transaction with more than one securities in-
termediary.  First, the term “investors” generally will be deemed to
include not only investors but also intermediaries that have rights in
securities held by other intermediaries.  Second, when necessary to
avoid confusion, this article will refer to a holder of an interest in se-
curities through an intermediary that itself holds an interest in the se-
curities through an intermediary as a “lower-tier holder,” and to that
holder’s interest as “lower-tier rights.”  Thus, in the example used
earlier in which a broker holds a 5% interest in 1,000,000 shares of
ABC stock held by a depository, and an investor holds a 1% interest
in that 5% interest, the investor would be a lower-tier holder, whose
interest would constitute lower-tier rights, with respect to both securi-
ties intermediaries.  The broker would be a lower-tier holder whose
interest would constitute lower-tier rights only with respect to the de-
pository.
III.  STATUS OF INVESTORS’ INTEREST
What is the legal status of investors’ interests in securities in such
indirect holding systems?  In the U.S., as discussed in more detail be-
low, the legal status of this interest is governed by Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which protects investors from
the credit risk of the intermediary by conferring property rights with
respect to the securities, notwithstanding that such rights relate to un-
allocated and indirectly held assets.  A similar position arises under
the general principles of English law, whereby investors enjoy pro-
prietary interests in securities under trust and co-ownership arrange-
ments, technically, equitable tenancies in common.20  In civil law ju-
risdictions, the position is less clear in the absence of special
legislation.
19. Id. at 839–40.
20. See BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES, supra note 1, at ch. 2.  However, U.K. leg-
islative clarification akin to the U.S. U.C.C. Article 8 would be welcome.  As explained below, it
is assumed here that the intermediary segregates client assets from its own holdings.  Where
segregation does not occur, there may be uncertainty.
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IV.  STATUS OF INDIRECT HOLDING INTERMEDIARY RISK
States are only now beginning to grapple with the intermediary
risk raised by indirect holding.21  Investors want to know that their
fractional undivided interests in securities held by failed securities in-
termediaries are not subject to the claims of creditors of those inter-
mediaries.  Securities intermediaries, such as brokers who themselves
own undivided interests in securities held by failed intermediaries,
want to know that those interests are not subject to the claims of
creditors of the failed intermediaries.  Furthermore, the problem of
intermediary risk equally is relevant for parties, such as lenders, that
extend secured credit to investors, because a creditor necessarily
takes its security interest in collateral subject to any limitations of the
transferor’s rights therein.22
The issue of intermediary risk in the indirect holding system ap-
pears to be resolved only in the United States23 and perhaps a handful
of other countries.24  In the absence of special legislation, the position
21. Although there are numerous legal risks associated with indirect holding of securities,
only intermediary risk is unique to an indirect holding system; other legal risks arise in any secu-
rities holding system and are addressed by traditional legal disciplines, such as the law of con-
tract, agency, corporations, and securities regulation.  See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra
note 1.
22. This result arises from the universally recognized principle of nemo dat quod non habet,
or “one who has not cannot give.”  See, e.g., Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for
Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL’s Contribution, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 315, 319 (1998)
(noting recognition of this principle in civil law states).  A recent report by the First Secretary at
the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law thus concludes:
“[T]here seems to be no reason to distinguish for [intermediary risk] purpose[s] title transfers
under collateral transactions from ordinary transfers by way of sale.”  Christophe Bernasconi,
First Secretary at the Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, The
Law Applicable to Dispositions of Securities Held Through Indirect Holding Systems 8 (Nov.
2000, Prelim. Doc. No. 1), available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/coll_sec_pd1.pdf (last
visited Apr. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Bernasconi Report].
23. In the United States, Article 8 of the U.C.C. was recently revised to address concerns
that intermediary risk in the indirect holding system would become systemic.  Revised Article 8
resolves intermediary risk by clarifying that investors have property rights in the securities (or
interests therein) held for them by intermediaries, not merely in personam claims against the
intermediaries.  U.C.C. § 8-503 (2001).  Accordingly, these securities and interests “are not
property of the securities intermediary, and are not subject to claims of creditors of the securi-
ties intermediary,” except in specific cases that should not pose the threat of systemic risk.
U.C.C. § 8-503(a) (2001).
24. Two important related issues arise in this context.  The first is intermediary risk; the
second is the legal location of clients’ interests in securities.  See, e.g., Bernasconi Report, supra
note 22, at 3 (observing that “[i]n most jurisdictions, neither the substantive laws governing se-
curities transactions nor the rules determining the law applicable to such transactions have been
updated adequately to reflect this” risk).  Besides the United States, only a handful of other
countries appear to have addressed this risk.  Japan adopted a law providing that parties are
presumed to have joint ownership in deposited stocks according to the records of their account
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in England, and, arguably, in other common law jurisdictions, de-
pends on whether the intermediary commingles its own assets with
those of the clients.  Where house and client accounts are segregated
clearly so that no such commingling occurs,25 there is a broad consen-
sus that clients enjoy proprietary interests in securities under the
principles of co-ownership and trust, as indicated above.  However,
where the intermediary mixes its own assets with the client pool, the
position is less clear.  In civil law jurisdictions, without special legisla-
tion, the availability of client property rights is uncertain even where
a commingled client pool is segregated from the assets of the inter-
mediary.
This limited resolution, however, may reflect the complexities of
the issue more than lack of concern.  Federal Reserve Board Chair-
man Alan Greenspan has urged other nations to follow the lead of
the United States in eliminating legal uncertainties by modernizing
books.  See Kabukento no Hokan to Furikae ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law Concerning Keeping of
Shares and other Securities], Law No. 30 of 1984, art. 24.  Korea enacted legislation similar to
the Japanese law.  See Chunggwon Koraebop [Securities Transaction Act], Act No. 2920 of
1976, art. 174-4, translated in 11 KOREAN LEGIS. RES. INST., 11 STATUTES OF THE REP. OF
KOREA 720 (1997).  German law gives investors preference, in certain circumstances, over
creditors of an insolvent custodian with respect to securities owned by the custodian.  See
BERND RUSTOR, 4 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY (FRG) 39.16[e] (1987); Gesetz
ueber die Verwahrung und Anschaffung von Wertpapieren (Depotgesetz-Depot G), v. 4.2.1937
(RGBl. I 171).  And Belgian law gives investors title to their share of dematerialized or immo-
bilized securities.  See Belgian Royal Decree No. 62 Facilitating the Circulation of Securities
(Nov. 10, 1967, as amended Apr. 7, 1995); see also Nina Hval, Credit Risk Reduction in the Inter-
national Over-the-Counter Market: Collateralizing the Net Exposure with Support Agreements,
31 INT’L LAW. 801, 815-816 (1997) (explaining this Decree).  Canada also is considering adopt-
ing provisions similar to U.C.C. Article 8.  See Eric Spink, Tiered Holding System—Uniform
Legislation Project, Report of the Production Committee (1997), available at http: //www. law.
ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/current/etiered.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).  See generally Bernasconi
Report, supra note 22, at 21–24 (describing certain provisions in English, Luxembourgian,
French, Italian, and Brazilian law); Gilles Thieffry & Julie Lynch Bridson, Minimising Legal
Uncertainty in Cross-Border Collateral Transactions, BANKING 2000, at 2, at
http://www.bankingmm.com/sexc/sexc11.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2002) (reporting that “Bel-
gium and Luxembourg, the places of organisation respectively of the depositories Euroclear and
Cedelbank . . . have adopted legislation [intended to reduce] some of the uncertainty associated
with conflict of laws issues governing the transfer and pledge of securities held through financial
intermediaries,” and that the European Union adopted a Directive on Settlement Finality in
Payment and Securities [Settlement] Systems [referring to the European Parliament’s Directive
98/26/EC of May 19, 1998] that is intended to clarify the conflict-of-laws rules governing collat-
eral transactions in European Union settlement systems); the proposed Financial Collateral Di-
rective, COM(01)168 at art. 10, 2001/0086 (COD).
25. For example, where the like assets of different clients are commingled, but the client
pool is segregated from the intermediary’s own assets.
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their legal rules on indirect securities holding.26  The Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law has placed this issue on its priority
agenda,27 by its mandate focusing on the narrower topic of choosing
applicable legal rules, as opposed to the unification of substantive le-
gal rules, which this article addresses.28  Other international organiza-
tions, such as the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT) and the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL), are focusing (as does this article) on
modernizing and unifying substantive legal rules on indirect securities
holding.29
26. See Rogers, supra note 3, at 1438 (quoting Chairman Greenspan’s March 3, 1995 re-
marks to this effect at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of At-
lanta).
27. E-mail from Christophe Bernasconi, First Secretary, Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law, to Steven L. Schwarcz (June 15, 2000) (on file with the Duke Journal of Com-
parative and International Law).
28. See http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/genaff.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2002) (providing
a link to the Hague Conference’s “Conclusions of the Special Commission of May 2000 on Gen-
eral Affairs and Policy of the Conference” which, at 25, in the context of the indirect holding
system explains: “[b]ecause securities have become computerised and because of the multiple
levels of intermediaries, the traditional rule of lex situs is no longer appropriate in this situa-
tion,” and therefore recommends the clarification of “applicable law rules for securities held
through intermediaries [as] a basis for the world-wide adoption of consistent principles); see also
Bernasconi Report, supra note 22, at 4.
29. See Comments on the Proposed Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to the Dis-
positions of Securities Held Through Indirect Holding Systems 1 (Jan. 12, 2001) (submitted by
UNIDROIT to the meeting of the Group of Experts, The Hague, Jan. 15–19, 2001) (stating that,
“following advice by some of the private-sector experts involved, UNIDROIT may address the
inherent problems of substantive law”); see also e-mail from Harold S. Burman, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Office of Legal Adviser (Private International Law), to Steven L. Schwarcz (Aug.
7, 2000) (summarizing an August 3, 2000 teleconference of the Global Electronic Policy Sub-
committee in which there was a consensus that “it may be timely to pursue unification of sub-
stantive rules[, which] already has been suggested as a topic for UNCITRAL within its secured
interest working group”) (on file with the author); E-mail from Herbert Kronke, Secretary
General of UNIDROIT, to Steven L. Schwarcz (Oct. 10, 2000) (stating that “clearing and set-
tlement issues (including the ‘intermediary risk’) are on the UNIDROIT work programme as
one problem area of the item ‘Transactions on Transnational Capital Markets’”) (on file with
the author).  Cf. Bernasconi Report, supra note 22, at 4, 26 (noting that although the Hague
Conference’s “proposed Convention will be confined to conflicts of laws issues,” harmonizing
“the substantive law relating to the nature of interests in respect of securities held through in-
termediaries is a major undertaking that may be considered by UNCITRAL or UNIDROIT in
the near future”).
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V.  ANALYSIS
Because securities trading crosses borders, intermediary risk
must be addressed in an international context.30  The analysis is set
forth at greater length in the Intermediary Risk article31 and only
summarized here.
The analysis of intermediary risk begins by examining the simple
case in which an intermediary holds securities in which it has no bene-
ficial rights.  It then builds on that examination by analyzing the more
difficult case, associated with the indirect holding system for securities
and other transactional patterns, in which an intermediary holds secu-
rities in which it shares beneficial rights.  These examinations reveal
that there is no reliable precedent for the treatment of intermediary
risk.
The analysis then proceeds from first principles.  It is a funda-
mental axiom that a creditor qua creditor cannot validly claim more
rights than its debtor has in property.32  This axiom is a corollary of
the universally recognized principle of nemo dat quod non habet, or
“one who has not cannot give.”33  Commercial law generally respects
nemo dat (and by extension the axiom)34 with only limited exceptions
that are inapplicable in this context.35  If, therefore, an intermediary
30. Schwarcz, in Intermediary Risk, supra note 1, at 1546, argues that a unified approach to
intermediary risk is also needed to address other forms of financing in which money flows
through an intermediary.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 61–62
(1999) (“It is one of the fundamental principles of English bankruptcy law that the trustee in
bankruptcy takes the bankrupt’s property ‘subject to equities,’ in the sense that any imperfec-
tions in that title, and any valid and subsisting claims arising from the property or any security
rights previously effected in relation to it, are transmitted intact so as to be exercisable against
the trustee as the new owner.”).  The rationale is that “the trustee is essentially a successor to
such title as the bankrupt actually had at the time of his adjudication, including any limitations
or imperfections in that title, and can enjoy no better position in relation to the property than
did the bankrupt himself formerly.”  IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 205 (2d ed.
1996); see also In re Kinsler, 24 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (“The Debtor’s creditors
could not get more than that to which the Debtor is entitled”).
33. See, e.g., Bazinas, supra note 22, at 319.
34. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOLAN & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, BASIC CONCEPTS IN
COMMERCIAL LAW 6 (1998) (arguing that the concept that transferees can enjoy greater rights
than their transferors enjoyed “is an idea that offends clear thinking.  To take by transfer more
than the transferor had is akin to magic.”).
35. For example, bona fide purchasers of goods and holders in due course of negotiable
instruments are not necessarily subject to defenses and encumbrances to which the transferor is
subject.  See U.C.C. §§ 2-403, 3-305, 9-307 (2000).  The rationale for these exceptions—that the
importance of free market transferability should override nemo dat in these situations—has
been questioned, however, and in any event does not apply to the transaction patterns of this
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only owns a partial (e.g., undivided) interest in securities, the axiom
indicates that the intermediary’s creditors in their capacity as such
only should be able to reach that partial interest.
This axiom might appear to, but in fact does not, resolve the
problem of intermediary risk.  That is because the difficult problem in
analyzing intermediary risk is even more fundamental than the axiom:
defining what rights the debtor should have in the property.  One sim-
ply cannot assume that contracts that purport to allocate partial
rights—such as undivided interests—between intermediaries and in-
vestors should be enforced.  Contracts are not universally enforced,
notwithstanding the banner of freedom of contract.  The presumption
of contract enforceability is generally rebuttable where the contract
violates law, harms the contracting parties (paternalism), or materi-
ally impinges on the rights of third parties (material externalities).36
Hence, a contract that purports to allocate partial property rights be-
tween an intermediary and investors might be unenforceable if it
violates law, causes such harm, or materially impinges on third-party
rights.  If unenforceable, the contract would be ineffective to allocate
these partial property rights.  That, in turn, would expose the prop-
erty to claims of the intermediary’s creditors, creating intermediary
risk.  The issue of intermediary risk thus turns conceptually on
whether contracts that allocate partial property rights between inter-
mediaries and investors should be unenforceable for one of these rea-
sons.
In the context of the indirect holding system for securities, there
is little reason to think that such contracts should violate law.  Pater-
nalistic concerns also are unlikely in this context because the inter-
mediaries are generally sophisticated commercial entities and the in-
vestors are often sophisticated or repeat players.  Accordingly, the
contractual allocation of rights between an intermediary and investors
should be enforceable absent the creation of material externalities.
This allocation is effectuated pursuant to contracts in which interme-
diaries purport to sell undivided interests in their securities to inves-
tors.  The potential externality is that a person extending credit to an
intermediary may be misled and think that the intermediary owns all
article.  See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 1, at 1573–77 (asking whether the corollary
of nemo dat should hold true in the indirect holding context, and reasoning why it should).
36. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Para-
digm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 545–46 (1999).  Cf. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58, 147 (1993).
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rights in the securities that it holds.37  This externality is material be-
cause it addresses the very essence of the intermediary’s ability to re-
pay its creditors.
Although this externality can be mitigated and made immaterial
by disclosing the lack of ownership to potential creditors, disclosure is
ineffective against existing or involuntary creditors.  These creditors
therefore will be unable to engage in an informed allocation of risk,
and the externality will remain.  Because of the persistence of mate-
rial externalities, legal systems must address the extent to which con-
tracts in which intermediaries purport to sell undivided interests in
their securities to investors, thereby producing the material external-
ity, should be enforced.
Should these contracts be enforced, the investors will own the se-
curities held by the intermediary to the extent of their undivided in-
terests therein, and the intermediary would have no rights in the in-
vestors’ interests in those securities.  The investors then would have
priority over claims of the intermediary’s creditors in accordance with
the aforesaid axiom that a creditor qua creditor cannot validly claim
more rights than its debtor has in property.  But if these contracts are
not enforced, the investors will be left only with in personam claims
against the intermediary, which would be pari passu with other unse-
cured claims and effectively subordinate in priority to secured claims.
To determine which path the law should take, a comparison must
be made between the consequences of enforcement and those of non-
enforcement.38  Such a comparison is appropriate because the focus is
not on whether the indirect holding system justifies its externalities;
rather, the article merely assumes that point.  If the assumption were
otherwise, the analysis would have to account for the externalities
caused by prohibiting the indirect holding system, such as the in-
creased costs and complexities of record-keeping and increased risk
of loss occasioned by physically transferring securities.  The analysis
therefore focuses on which parties—an intermediary’s creditors, or its
investors—should bear the externalities.39
37. Cf. PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 36 (1995) (arguing
that traditional civil law objections to the trust may be based on a concern that trusts are unfair
to creditors of the legal owner, who believe they can claim against all assets that the legal owner
appears to own).
38. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 1.
39. This approach is a variant of the traditional law and economics approach of allocating
risk to the lower-cost bearer of the costs of risk-bearing and monitoring.  See, e.g., JEFFERY L.
HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 94 (2d ed. 2000).  The first part of the variation compares
consequences, instead of merely comparing which parties (the intermediary’s investors or credi-
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In the context of the indirect securities holding system, the en-
forcement of contracts in which intermediaries purport to sell undi-
vided interests in their securities to investors would give investors
priority over claims of the intermediary’s creditors.  This might ap-
pear to discourage financiers from extending credit to intermediaries
to enable them to engage in margin lending—the on-lending of such
credit to investors to enable them, in turn, to purchase securities.
Whether margin lending would be discouraged, however, is doubtful:
intermediaries typically require investors to pledge the purchased se-
curities as collateral for their margin loans, and financiers concerned
about the credit of their borrowers will require the intermediaries to
re-pledge these securities as collateral for the original credit.40  This
re-pledge effectively provides those financiers with priority over
competing investor claims.41
Non-enforcement, on the other hand, would leave investors with
mere in personam claims against intermediaries, which would be pari
passu with other unsecured claims and subordinate in priority to se-
cured claims.  This may discourage investors from dealing with any
but the financially strongest intermediaries.42  Moreover, even if an
investor were to attempt to protect him or herself by dealing with a
financially strong intermediary, such as a large and established bro-
kerage house, the investor could not easily control the selection of
upper-tier intermediaries—the investor may not, for example, even
tors) are the lower-cost risk bearers.  This is needed because the consequences of enforcing or
not enforcing contracts that purport to transfer undivided interests affect more than those par-
ties.  The second part of the variation–disregarding which parties are the lower-cost monitors–
defers analysis for the sake of clarity.  It is later shown that generally the same parties who are
the lower-cost risk bearers are also the lower-cost monitors.  That the lower-cost risk bearers
and monitors are the same parties makes the analysis of risk allocation relatively simple by
avoiding the need to discount the consequences of the risk by the probability of the risk occur-
ring (“risk” being a function of both the probability of the risk-event occurring; the term “moni-
toring” merely being shorthand for trying to prevent the risk-event and the amount of loss that
will result if the risk-event in fact occurs).
40. Kenneth C. Kettering, Repledge Deconstructed, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 45, 51 (1999).
41. Id. at 185.  In some states, it might be desirable to give even broader priority to claims
of the intermediary’s creditors over ownership interests of investors.  As a practical matter, such
priority could be achieved by statutorily subordinating investor ownership to such claims.  Be-
cause, however, that could discourage investment, a state might not wish to impose subordina-
tion without compensating impaired investors, such as through regulatory protection of their
interests.
42. For example, the “common response” in civil law states that lack a default rule limiting
intermediary risk is “to employ as [intermediaries] only large and stable institutions, such as
banks, that are unlikely to go bankrupt.”  Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of
Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 458 (1998)
(citation omitted).
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know the identity of all the upper-tier intermediaries.  The failure of
an upper-tier intermediary would permit that intermediary’s creditors
to attach securities in which the investor owns an interest.  Even if the
investor’s intermediary were made liable, by law or contract, for up-
per-tier intermediary risk, an upper-tier intermediary’s failure could,
in an example of systemic risk, impair the ability of lower-tier inter-
mediaries to pay their obligations.  Recognizing this risk, investors
may refuse to invest.
The balance therefore appears to favor contract enforcement.
With contract enforcement, investors are protected, and financiers
concerned about extending credit to intermediaries can protect them-
selves by demanding collateral.  Without such enforcement, investors
would be exposed.43  In an indirect securities holding system, contracts
in which intermediaries purport to sell undivided interests in their se-
curities to investors should be enforced, notwithstanding externalities
to the intermediary’s creditors.  Intermediary risk thus should not
arise.44
There appear to be only two arguments against enforcing con-
tracts for the sale of undivided interest in securities, both of which
fail.  First, as between two parties, risk sometimes should be allocated
to the lower-cost monitor of the risk.  In our case, however, the in-
termediary’s creditors are the lower-cost monitors, because they al-
ready have an incentive to monitor the intermediary, the only party to
which they can look for repayment.  Investors, on the other hand,
have no incentive, absent the existence of intermediary risk, to moni-
tor the intermediary, because they can only look to, and therefore
only will monitor, the issuer for repayment.  Concern over intermedi-
ary risk only increases the overall monitoring cost, by imposing on in-
vestors the additional incentive to monitor their intermediaries.  Be-
cause however, an intermediary’s bankruptcy would jeopardize
creditor repayment, it would not commensurately reduce the moni-
toring incentive of creditors.  Furthermore, intermediary risk may in-
crease more than monitoring cost if investors opt out of transactions
43. Only financiers would be protected, and even their protection would be at risk where
the intermediary-borrower itself obtains its interest in securities through a financially weak in-
termediary; without enforcement, the financier’s claim against its intermediary-borrower effec-
tively would be subject to prior claims of creditors of the financially weak intermediary.
44. The Intermediary Risk article also reached this same conclusion in the context of each
other transaction pattern considered.  See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 1, at 1602–03.
The conclusion therein, stated more intuitively, is that if a given transfer of assets would consti-
tute a sale, the fact that only an undivided interest in those assets is being transferred should not
defeat sale treatment.
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in which this risk could arise.  For example, faced with monitoring the
immediate intermediary as well as each upper-tier intermediary,
whose identities may not even be known, investors may decide to
shift their investments to securities that are subject to direct holding.
This shift would further increase costs by foregoing the very real
benefits that led to the creation of the indirect holding system.45
Second, divided ownership traditionally is viewed as inefficient
because it is awkward or impractical for the market alone to deter-
mine which third-party transferees are to share possession with cur-
rent owners.  This argument fails because traditional inefficiencies do
not apply to the transaction patterns discussed in this article.46  For
example, the price of securities can be determined readily from the
market: each investor’s undivided interest in securities at any time
thus is simply the dollar amount of such investor’s investment in such
securities divided by the aggregate dollar amount of all unpaid in-
vestments in such securities.  Accordingly, such contractual sharing of
undivided interests should not, in and of itself, be inefficient.
Contracts in which intermediaries purport to sell undivided in-
terests in their securities to investors therefore should be enforced,
notwithstanding externalities to the intermediary’s creditors.47  This,
however, is a normative thesis.  The discussion below examines how
this thesis can be implemented into a rule of positive law.
VI.  IMPLEMENTATION
In a domestic legal system, implementation of a proposition into
law is relatively straightforward: articulate the proposition as a rule of
law and enact the law.  But in an international context, in order to
minimize transaction costs, it is crucial to implement the rule of law in
a way that binds parties in different nation states with maximum uni-
formity. 48  To that end, one first must examine, just as does the Inter-
45. Actual experience with loan participation and securitization transactions illustrates the
cost increases from opting out.  Banks frequently engage in the more complex and costly proc-
ess of loan syndication in order to avoid intermediary risk from participation.  Parties also fre-
quently contract out of intermediary risk in securitizations by structuring their transactions, at
increased cost, as sales of whole receivables.  See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 1, at
1587.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1584.
48. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 255, 256 (1998) (arguing that “market and institutional intermedia-
tion are unlikely to arise, let alone flourish, without a legal infrastructure that provides uniform,
predictable, stable rules of behavior”).
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mediary Risk article, how the aforesaid thesis should be articulated as
a rule of law.49  Then one must examine how that rule should be im-
plemented into law, taking into account that in many transactions in-
volving intermediary risk, the parties—investors, intermediaries, and
their creditors—may be located in diverse states.
VII.  ARTICULATING THE THESIS AS A RULE OF LAW
The aforesaid thesis is that an intermediary and investors should
be able to make an enforceable contract that allocates their respective
undivided interests in securities held by the intermediary, notwith-
standing the creation of material externalities.50  Because the thesis
focuses on the enforceability of contracts, the simplest way to articu-
late it as a rule of law is to restate it in contract law terms.  A hypo-
thetical contract law rule thus might state that a contract between an
intermediary and investors that purports to allocate their respective
undivided interests in securities held by the intermediary, shall be en-
forceable.  This, however, might be insufficient, because contract law
usually only binds the parties to a contract.51  Hence, third-party
claimants—such as the intermediary’s creditors—would not be
bound.
Property law both serves this function, and also presents a more
intuitive source of law in this context than does contract law.  In con-
trast to contract law, property law provides rights “good against the
world,” thereby binding non-contracting creditors.52  Moreover, the
consequence of the hypothetical contract law rule—that a contract
49. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 1, at 1589.
50. Id. at 1584.  The Intermediary Risk article actually analyzes and proposes a broader
thesis: that an intermediary and investors should be able to make an enforceable contract that
allocates their respective undivided interests in any property held by the intermediary, notwith-
standing the creation of material externalities.  The present article’s narrower thesis is a subset
of, and not intended to limit, that broader thesis.
51. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in
the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267,
289 (1988) (observing that, analytically, “contract is a right good only as against determinate
persons—those with whom one has made the contract”).
52. See id. (observing that on the “sophisticated legal basis, expounded by Professor
Wesley Hohfeld, . . . the distinctive feature of property is that it is a right ‘good against all the
world,’ while contract is a right good only as against determinate persons . . . with whom one has
made the contract,” citing Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 719 n.22 (1917), and explaining that “[A] particular object
may give rise to both contractual rights and property rights.  X may contract with Y for exclu-
sive use and enjoyment of real property owned by Y.  X has a contractual right as against Y; if Y
enters the property he is in breach of contract.  However, X also has obtained, by virtue of the
contract, rights against the world, in the nature of property rights.”).
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shall be enforceable between an intermediary and investors purport-
ing to allocate their respective undivided interests in securities held
by the intermediary—is that such an allocation is effective to transfer
ownership of these interests.  Transferring ownership, however, is
traditionally addressed by property law.
The thesis therefore would have a broader and more intuitive
application if formulated as a rule of property law.53  Such a rule could
be tentatively articulated as follows: “The transfer of an undivided
fractional interest in securities shall constitute a valid and enforceable
transfer of that interest to the same extent and in the same manner as
if that interest had been a separate asset.”  The next step is to exam-
ine how this proposed rule should be implemented into property law
on an international basis.  Before engaging in that examination, how-
ever, it is necessary to examine whether the proposed rule should be
subject to any exceptions.
VIII.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROPOSED RULE
As a reality check, it is useful to compare the proposed rule to
existent law addressing intermediary risk.  The most comprehensive
law currently in effect is Article 8 of the U.C.C., which is consistent
conceptually with the rule proposed above, subject to three excep-
tions.
The first exception is for multiple tiers of intermediaries.  An in-
vestor may not be in privity with all of the intermediaries holding se-
curities in which the investor owns an interest.  It would be difficult
for intermediaries not in privity to know the identity of those inves-
tors or the amount of their interests.  Article 8 responds to this diffi-
culty by limiting the ability of investors, and their creditors, to assert
rights or claims against intermediaries that are not in privity.  The
proposed rule should similarly limit the assertion of rights and claims
because it is impractical in an indirect holding system for upper-tier
intermediaries to maintain records about, or even to know the exis-
tence of, investors with whom they are not in privity.54
53. In the context of revising U.C.C. Article 8, some scholars have opposed property-based
rules.  See, e.g., Jeanne Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of
Secured Lending on Wall Street COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291, 357 (1994); Mooney, supra note 3, at
310.  These scholars, however, appear to have been opposing only the application of traditional
property rules that attempt to trace property to specific underlying securities, not the concept of
undivided ownership.
54. See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 1.  This limitation also would foster finality
of settlement in securities trades.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-503, cmt. 3 (2001) (“Although one can
devise hypothetical scenarios where particular customers might find it advantageous to be able
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The second exception arises where investors do not need priority
in order to satisfy their rights.  This exception, however, is trivial be-
cause intermediary risk then would be inconsequential.  Therefore,
any intermediary risk permitted by this exception could not give rise
to systemic risk.
The third exception arises when secured creditors are in control
of an intermediary’s securities.55  This exception appears extraordi-
nary because it subordinates a third party’s ownership interest to a
security interest given without the owner’s consent.  In the event of a
dispute between investors and secured creditors of an insolvent in-
termediary, the investors’s ownership interest would be subordinate
to secured creditor claims.  One possible explanation for this excep-
tion is pragmatic.56  A pragmatic explanation however is ultimately
unconvincing.57  Another explanation is that the exception merely re-
flects how the market actually works; but ultimately that explanation
is not persuasive because one should not respond to an “ought” ques-
tion with an “is” answer.58  The official comments to Article 8 none-
theless offer a third, more compelling, explanation.59  In the United
States, a federal regulatory scheme protects investors against the risk
that their ownership interests in securities will be impaired if those
securities are held by a failed intermediary.60  This government pro-
tection minimizes the consequences of favoring secured creditors.
to assert rights against someone other than the customers’ own intermediary, commercial law
rules that permitted customers to do so would impair rather than promote the interest of inves-
tors and the safe and efficient operation of the clearance and settlement system . . . . The uncer-
tainties that would result from rules permitting such recoveries would work to the disadvantage
of all participants in the securities markets.”).
55. Under U.C.C. § 8-511 (2000), secured creditors in control of an intermediary’s securi-
ties have priority over lower-tier holders.
56. See U.C.C. § 8-503, cmt. 1 (2001) (stating that “[s]ince securities intermediaries gener-
ally do not segregate securities in such fashion that one could identify particular securities as the
ones held for customers, it would not be realistic for this section to state that ‘customers’ securi-
ties’ are not subject to creditors’ claims.”).
57. See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 1.
58. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107
YALE L.J. 1807, 1814–5 (1998) (arguing that “the appropriate response to an ‘ought’ claim is an
‘ought not’ claim, not an ‘is’ claim”).
59. See U.C.C. § 8-511, cmts. (2001).  Even this rationale fails to explain, however, why un-
secured creditor claims are not likewise favored.
60. Under Rules 8c-1 and 15c2-1 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), a securities intermediary is prohibited from giving a security interest in customer securi-
ties without the customer’s consent.  See U.C.C. § 8-511, cmt. 2 (2001) (paraphrasing those SEC
Rules).  Brokers are required to maintain a sufficient inventory of unencumbered securities to
satisfy customer claims.  See Securities and Exchange Commission General Rules and Regula-
tions, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2001); see also U.C.C. § 8-504 (2000) (mirroring that requirement).  If a
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It appears doubtful that Article 8 would favor secured claims
over ownership interests absent this type of comprehensive regulatory
protection.61  Accordingly, absent similar worldwide regulatory pro-
tection, there would appear to be insufficient justification for the pro-
posed rule to favor an intermediary’s secured creditors over investors.
Of course, on a case-by-case basis, states that have or enact regulatory
schemes protecting investors from the consequences thereof should
consider whether favoring an intermediary’s secured creditors over
investors as an exception to the proposed rule would be appropriate,
for example, to encourage asset-based lending to securities firms.  In-
deed, one noted scholar argues that favoring an intermediary’s se-
cured creditors over investors “is a necessary consequence of the way
that security interests . . . work for securities . . . . It’s not that you can
[favor secured creditors] if you have a good regulatory structure; it’s
that you need a good regulatory structure because you must favor se-
cured creditors.”62
The foregoing analysis indicates that there should be at least one
general exception to the proposed rule, to address the problem of
multiple tiering of intermediaries.  Taking this exception into account,
the rule can be restated as follows (as so restated, the “Rule”):
The transfer of an undivided fractional interest in securities shall
constitute a valid and enforceable transfer of that interest to the
same extent and in the same manner as if that interest had been a
separate asset.  Holders of securities in which undivided interests
have been transferred shall, to the extent of such transfers, be
deemed to hold such securities for their transferees, but only trans-
failed broker fails to maintain a sufficient unencumbered inventory, its customers are protected
against loss under the Securities Investor Protection Act, which established the Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corporation to pay that loss.  See U.C.C. § 8-511 cmt. 2 (2001); see also Securities
Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-1(d), 78fff-3(a) (2000).
61. See U.C.C. § 8-511, cmt. 2 (2001) (stating that “[A]rticle 8 is premised on the view that
the important policy of protecting investors against the risk of wrongful conduct by their inter-
mediaries is sufficiently treated by other law.”); accord Schroeder, supra note 53, at 300–01
(cautioning that “[w]ithout [the regulatory protection provided in the U.S. by the SEC (Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission) and SIPC (Security Investors Protection Corporation)], the
overall preference given to the lending industry over consumers by the proposed revisions must
be rethought.”).  But see Rogers, supra note 3, at 1539 (arguing that a highly regulated securities
system is not essential to revised Article 8’s functioning); E-mail from Eric Spink, Vice-Chair,
Alberta Securities Commission, to Steven L. Schwarcz, at 4–5 (Aug. 1, 2001) (on file with the
author) (arguing that favoring secured creditors over investors predates regulatory protection).
62. E-mail from James S. Rogers, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School and Re-
porter, NCCUSL (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) Drafting
Committee to Revise U.C.C. Article 8, to Steven L. Schwarcz (Sept. 6, 2001) (on file with the
author).
SCHWARCZ-BENJAMIN_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  4:14 PM
2002] INTERMEDIARY RISK IN THE INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM 327
ferors and transferees that are in privity may prosecute rights di-
rectly against each other on account of such transfers.63
In addition, states that have regulatory schemes protecting investors
from the consequences thereof should consider a non-uniform excep-
tion to the Rule, favoring an intermediary’s secured creditors over in-
vestors.  Arguably, states that lack such regulatory schemes should
enact them for this purpose.
IX.  IMPLEMENTING THE RULE INTO LAW
ON AN INTERNATIONAL BASIS
In general, there are three ways that a rule can be implemented
into law internationally.  First, states can agree with one or more
other states that they and their residents will observe the rule, by be-
coming parties or signatories to a treaty or convention.  Second, the
rule can be formulated as a uniform model law to be enacted into na-
tional law by each state wishing to do so.  Third, the rule can be ex-
pressed as model language for parties to incorporate into their con-
tracts as they deem appropriate.  The Intermediary Risk article argues
that the Rule should be implemented as a uniform model law.64
It is theoretically possible for the Rule to be implemented as a
treaty, but such a formal approach appears unnecessary and might
raise unwarranted political hurdles.  It is unnecessary because the
Rule does not purport to govern transactions between states qua
states, merely transactions between residents of different states.  Fur-
thermore, one of the major advantages provided by a treaty—the
ability to impose an international dispute settlement mechanism—is
not needed in the context of the Rule.  Implementing the Rule as a
treaty might raise unwarranted political hurdles because some states,
such as the United States, require extraordinary measures to bind
themselves to a treaty.  In practice, a rule that does not govern trans-
actions between states qua states often can be implemented more
easily through a uniform model law.
States that would be prepared to adopt the Rule through a treaty
therefore may simply prefer to enact it into national law based on a
63. As previously mentioned, the Intermediary Risk article analyzes and proposes a
broader thesis and therefore reaches a broader rule, subject to exceptions: that an intermediary
and investors should be able to make an enforceable contract that allocates their respective un-
divided interests in any property held by the intermediary, notwithstanding the creation of ma-
terial externalities.  The present article’s narrower “Rule” is a subset of, and not intended to
limit, that broader rule.
64. See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 1, at 1600–01.
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model law template.  This sometimes is referred to as a uniform
model law approach because whenever a rule is formulated as a
model law the intention is for states to adopt the law in as uniform a
manner as possible.  Such an approach would be almost as effective as
a treaty because a model law, like a treaty, would equally bind resi-
dents of states that have adopted it.  Indeed, a model law, once
adopted, is part of a state’s national law, whereas treaties may have to
provide that their rules be enacted separately by the state into na-
tional law in order to bind residents.65
The final alternative—that parties incorporate model language
into private contracts—is unrealistic.  The parties primarily intended
to be governed by the Rule—creditors of intermediaries—are not
parties to, and therefore are not bound by, contracts between inter-
mediaries and investors.  In contrast, a state that enacts the Rule into
its national law binds not only intermediaries and investors but also
creditors of intermediaries that are resident in that state.
X.  CONCLUSIONS
The Rule should be implemented as a model law, the text of
which might read as follows:
Proposed Model Law to Regulate Intermediary Risk
(a) The transfer of an undivided fractional interest in securities shall
constitute a valid and enforceable transfer of that interest to the same
extent and in the same manner as if that interest had been a separate
asset.
(b) Holders of securities in which undivided interests have been trans-
ferred shall, to the extent of such transfers, be deemed to hold such
securities for their transferees, but only transferors and transferees
that are in privity may prosecute rights directly against each other on
account of such transfers.66
65. This is not to say that a model law approach categorically is better than a treaty for im-
plementing the Rule.  A treaty approach, for example, could use the negotiation process to
build consensus around the Rule and increase its perceived legitimacy.  Any state unwilling or
unable to ratify the treaty always could choose to enact national legislation consistent with the
Rule.  Also, a model law lacks an international oversight mechanism to ensure the consistency
of each national law enacted pursuant to the template, whereas a treaty could create such an
oversight mechanism.
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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In addition, states that have regulatory schemes protecting inves-
tors from the consequences thereof should consider a non-uniform
exception to this model law, favoring an intermediary’s secured credi-
tors over investors.  States that lack such regulatory schemes should
enact them in order to allow this exception.
This model law approach is, of course, a model for the enactment
of a uniform substantive law.  It is useful, in closing, to compare this
approach with the conflict of laws approach being considered by the
Hague Conference on Private International Law.  To be effective,
each approach must address the problem that intermediary risk un-
dermines the “absolute assurance” needed by lenders that “the col-
lateral being pledged [to them] is enforceable against third parties.”67
Such assurance requires that “[i]n the event of the insolvency of ei-
ther the [investor] as collateral provider, or the financial intermedi-
ary, the [lender] has a perfected interest (either through outright
ownership or a valid security interest) in the collateral, free from the
grasp of the [investor’s], or the financial intermediary’s, other credi-
tors.”68
Under existing legal systems, a lender can rarely obtain this as-
surance because it will not know, without consulting counsel in the
investor’s, each intermediary’s, the issuer’s, and perhaps other juris-
dictions, whether its security interest has priority over the investor’s
and each intermediary’s creditors.  This uncertainty reflects that, in an
indirect holding system, a proprietary interest in securities may “have
a nexus with multiple jurisdictions—that of the issuer’s place of or-
ganisation, the place where the underlying securities are physically lo-
cated [in the case of securities evidenced by a certificate], the place
where the register recording the interests is maintained (assuming the
securities are in registered form), the place where each intermediary
maintains its records evidencing the book-entry interest and the place
where the investor is located . . . .”69  The transaction costs of con-
sulting counsel in so many jurisdictions can be prohibitive.
A conflict of laws approach would address this problem by im-
posing international rules to clarify which jurisdictions’ laws are ap-
67. Thieffry & Lynch Bridson, supra note 24.
68. Id.; accord Bernasconi Report, supra note 22, at 16 (arguing that a lender needs to
know, before extending credit to an investor under the Report’s typical fact pattern, “which re-
quirements have to be fulfilled so as to ensure that the [lender] will receive an interest that will
prevail over the interests of third parties”).
69. Thieffry & Lynch Bridson, supra note 24; see also Bernasconi Report, supra note 22, at
16–17.
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plicable, thereby reducing transaction costs.70  However, a conflict of
laws approach cannot, by itself, fully resolve this problem.  Some-
times conflict of laws rules might point, for example, to a jurisdiction
whose substantive law effectively subordinates the lender’s security
interest to rights of the investor’s or an intermediary’s creditors.
Also, whereas this discussion so far has assumed that the lender is
collateralized by a proprietary interest in securities, sometimes there is
uncertainty whether the collateral is a property right in underlying se-
curities or merely an in personam claim against the immediate inter-
mediary.71  Then, “[n]o collateral taker would likely assume [the] in-
termediary insolvency risk.”72
A substantive law approach, in contrast, would solve these
problems conclusively, to the extent that nations harmonize their laws
to clarify that investors in indirect holding systems hold, and there-
fore lenders to such investors would be collateralized by, proprietary
interests in securities as to which lower-tier holders (such as inves-
tors) always have priority over upper-tier holders (such as intermedi-
aries) and their creditors.73  That is the approach taken in this article
and the Intermediary Risk article and also is the approach being con-
sidered by UNIDROIT.74
70. See Bernasconi Report, supra note 22, at 29, 31–39.
71. See id. at 20, 29–30.
72. Thieffry & Lynch Bridson, supra note 24.
73. This is subject to any rules in favor of good faith purchasers without notice that may
operate in certain jurisdictions.
74. Accord Thieffry & Lynch Bridson, supra note 24 (concluding that “[o]nly after all ju-
risdictions modernise, and ideally standardise their laws, will we mitigate further the risks, legal
uncertainties and additional costs associated with cross-border collateral transactions”).
